Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence by Martin Cincibuch et al.
190                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
JEL Classification: E52, E58 
Keywords: balance sheet, central bank, economic convergence, monetary policy, real appreciation, 
risk premium, seigniorage, transition 
Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence
* 
Martin CINCIBUCH – Czech National Bank (martin.cincibuch@cnb.cz) 
Tomáš HOLUB – Czech National Bank (tomas.holub@cnb.cz) 
Jaromír HURNÍK – Czech National Bank (jaromir.hurnik@cnb.cz) (corresponding author)  
Abstract 
This paper discusses central bank losses and develops a formal framework for assessing 
the sustainability of its balance sheet. Analyzing the consequences of economic conver-
gence in depth, it emphasizes the role played by the risk premium and equilibrium real 
exchange rate appreciation. A closed-form comparative-static analysis and also numeri-
cal solutions of the future evolution of the central bank’s own capital are presented. 
Applying this framework to an example of a converging economy, namely the Czech 
Republic, we find that the Czech National Bank should be able to repay its accumulated 
loss in about 15 years without any transfer from public budgets. 
1. Introduction 
While under standard circumstances a central bank should operate with profit, 
numerous central banks have faced substantial losses that have led over time to 
an accumulation of negative capital. This has naturally raised the issue of whether 
a  central bank can successfully conduct its monetary policy even with a  negative 
level of its own capital.  
The aim of this paper is to provide a practical framework for assessing the abil-
ity of a central bank to keep its balance sheet sustainable without having to default on 
its policy objectives given the current level of its own capital and the economic pro-
spects. It builds on Holub (2001b), Bindseil et al. (2004), and Ize (2005). While 
the basic rules that govern central bank financing are derived in those articles, the pre-
sent paper avoids some simplifications of the central bank’s balance sheet and the short 
cuts used in the macroeconomic context that may constrain the use of those earlier 
papers for practical analyses of a central bank’s own capital.  
In particular, the present paper discusses in more detail the consequences of 
economic convergence for the evolution of the central bank’s balance sheet.
1 Eco-
nomic convergence typically includes some combination of GDP catch-up from 
an initially low level along with price level convergence, which means real exchange 
rate appreciation,
2 a high – but gradually decreasing – risk premium on domestic as-
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sets, some progress with disinflation, relatively fast growth of currency in circulation 
supported by fast GDP growth, and increasing monetization of the  economy. All 
these factors have implications for the  central bank’s financial performance, but 
the present paper stresses above all the important role played by the risk premium 
and equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation. It also provides both a closed-form 
comparative-static analysis and numerical solutions of the future evolution of the cen-
tral bank’s own capital, exploiting some complementarities of the two approaches.  
This framework is applied to the example of the Czech National Bank (CNB), 
which has incurred considerable losses since 2000, and which is currently operating 
with substantially negative own capital.
3 At the end of 2007, its accumulated loss 
stood at CZK 200 bn., which is equivalent to 57% of the currency in circulation, or 6.7% 
of nominal GDP. Its negative own capital was only slightly lower, at CZK 176 bn. We 
show that under most plausible scenarios the CNB will be able to repay its current 
losses at the horizon of approximately 15 years out of its future profits. We believe 
that such an analysis could be applied to many central banks in transition and emerg-
ing market economies, even though one has to keep in mind country specifics in 
terms of economic development, central bank accounting practices, and institutional 
set-up.  
The rest of this text is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the exist-
ing literature regarding central bank financing and discusses the extensions that are 
made in this paper. In section 3, we build a comprehensive model of a central bank’s 
balance sheet, discuss the consequences of economic convergence, and derive basic 
rules for the evolution of the central bank’s own capital ratio. Section 4 is devoted to 
the specific case of the CNB. It describes the historical experience of the CNB and it 
compares the historical simulations based on our model with the actual history of 
the CNB’s balance sheet. Furthermore, we attempt to find out how the CNB’s own 
capital may evolve in the future. To do so, we link the balance-sheet model with 
the CNB’s macroeconomic forecast published in its Inflation Reports. Finally, sec-
tion 5 concludes.  
2. Existing Literature and New Developments 
The economic literature has long discussed the sources of central bank losses 
and their possible remedies. While the quasi-fiscal origins of the losses and the po-
tential need for central bank re-capitalization were explored by Fry (1993), Macken-
zie and Stella (1996), and Dalton and Dziobek (1999), there is also a literature which 
focuses on losses related to high foreign exchange reserves. It includes Holub 
(2001a) and Higgins and Klitgaard (2004). Interestingly, Hawkins (2003) mentioned 
sterilized foreign exchange interventions as a special case of loss-making quasi-fiscal 
activities. Exchange rate losses were also discussed by Stella and Lönnberg (2008) 
and Stella (2008).
4  
3 There are many central banks in emerging economies that face repeated losses, namely the central banks 
of Romania and Slovakia in the Central European region, Thailand and Indonesia in Asia, and Chile in
South America. While the framework developed here applies to all those central banks in general, the prac-
tical application of comparative-static analysis or dynamic simulation of future losses/profits is extremely
difficult for non-insiders due to different accounting standards and procedures as well as to different levels
of publication openness when it comes to the balance sheet of the central bank. 
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This paper deals with the formal link between the central bank’s balance sheet 
and its macroeconomic context. It adds to a stream of the literature represented main-
ly by Holub (2001b), Bindseil et al. (2004), and Ize (2005). Bindseil et al. (2004) 
introduced a theoretically useful formal framework consisting in a simplified central 
bank balance sheet and a simple macroeconomic model based on the  Wicksellian 
relationship between inflation and interest rates, and provided simulations of central 
bank capital. However, some of their model assumptions were too strong from 
a practical perspective. Especially for open economies, a non-zero risk premium or 
systematic changes in the real exchange rate may play a significant role, but the mod-
el of Bindseil et al. (2004) does not deal explicitly with those phenomena.  
Holub (2001b) and Ize (2005) in their analyses give a prominent role to the risk 
premium as a key determinant of central bank profits. Both papers provide an analytical 
exposition of central bank capital and its convergence to steady-state values. In doing 
so, they highlight the importance of the difference between the domestic interest rate 
and the growth rate of currency in circulation, as well as the level of central bank pro-
fits with zero own capital (“core profits” in the terminology of Ize, 2005). However, 
significant simplifications are still present in these models. First, they do not explicitly 
deal with the real exchange rate trend, which is a salient feature of many converging 
economies. On the contrary, Ize (2005) assumes that in the long run the relative version 
of purchasing power parity holds and, consequently, the risk premium is calculated as 
the difference between domestic and foreign real interest rates. Second, the possibility 
that the real growth of currency holdings exceeds the real interest rate is excluded in Ize 
(2005). Nevertheless, in a converging economy, appreciation of the real exchange rate 
may cause the  real interest rate to fall below the  foreign real interest rate, but 
the monetization of the economy may be rising at the same time.  
Besides modeling issues, the emergence of the losses and negative own cap-
ital of some central banks has stimulated a debate of what policy implications this 
may have. Already, Fry (2003) has articulated the possibility of inflation control be-
ing abandoned in reaction to the worsening of a central bank’s balance sheet. More 
recent contributions dealing with the link between sustainability of the central bank’s 
financial situation and its ability to perform its policy goals include Holub (2001b), 
Sims (2003), Bindseil et al. (2004), Ize (2005), Stella (2005), and Stella and Lönn-
berg (2008).  
Bindseil et al. (2004) focused on credibility issues and argued that a loss- 
-making central bank is simply not believed to ignore its balance sheet while 
conducting monetary policy. Moreover, they raised the possibility that after a period 
of protracted losses, the public may begin to worry that the central bank will lose its 
right to issue legal tender. Stella and Lönnberg (2008) coined the term “policy in-
solvency” to describe situations in which a central bank’s policy decisions are af-
fected by its financial condition.  
Ize (2005) develops the concept of “core capital,” i.e., the minimum capital 
needed by a central bank to ensure the credibility of its inflation target. Core capital 
is a function of the central bank’s operating expenditures and the carrying cost of its 
international reserves. In addition to core capital, a  policy variable called “core 
inflation” is introduced. It links core capital and the central bank’s credibility. “Core 
inflation” may be adjusted to keep the central bank’s capital in positive values. How-
ever, Ize (2005) does not discuss the  possibility of changes in foreign exchange Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                              193 
reserves, even though their ratio to currency in circulation is in fact treated as another 
potential policy variable that does not endogenously evolve.  
However, the inflation risk might be overemphasized by the model of Bindseil 
et al. (2004) and Ize (2005). They assume stability of the public’s demand for cur-
rency, but higher inflation induced by the central bank to improve its finances would 
lead to currency substitution and thus limit the central bank’s incentive to resort to 
such a solution.  
Building mainly on Holub (2001b), Bindseil et al. (2004), and Ize (2005), we 
refine the discussion in several aspects. First, we introduce a coherent open-economy 
framework and economic convergence issues into the analysis. These bring the links 
between the real exchange rate, domestic and foreign real interest rates, and the risk 
premium into the game. Second, we work explicitly with monetary income, which 
allows for a structured discussion of factors influencing the central bank’s balance 
sheet. Third, we add the sensitivity of money demand to inflation to the analysis. 
Fourth, we relax the assumption of a strictly exogenous, policy-determined ratio of 
foreign exchange reserves to currency in circulation. This is done by splitting the for-
eign exchange reserves into autonomous and discretionary parts. The autonomous 
part depends on the relationship between the return on the reserves and the growth of 
currency in circulation, whereas the discretionary part depends on the central bank’s 
decision to make interventions in the foreign exchange market. This split facilitates 
modeling of the foreign exchange reserves ratio as another policy variable in addition 
to “core inflation,” by means of which the central bank may adjust its profitability. 
Moreover, the autonomous development of the reserves ratio allows us to discuss if 
such an adjustment is achievable over time in a passive manner, or if it requires some 
active balance-sheet restructuring actions by the central bank.  
We intend to provide a realistic and pragmatic approach that can be used for 
analyses and dynamic simulations of the central bank balance sheet given its current 
structure and a reasonably reliable long-term economic outlook. Such simulations 
should show whether active adjustment of the balance-sheet structure is necessary. In 
effect, they may help the central bank to adopt a proper communication strategy and 
thus deal with the credibility challenges arising from its negative capital.  
3. The Central Bank Balance Sheet in a Converging Country 
This section discusses the conditions under which the future stream of gains 
will save the central bank from indefinite loss accumulation, and when eventually 
the central bank’s loss may follow an explosive path.  
We start our exposition with the balance-sheet model that is used later on for 
the simulations. For a better understanding, however, we develop a detailed analyt-
ical framework, too. Both the  balance-sheet model and the  analytical framework 
incorporate important features of an open economy on a convergence path.  
Let us begin with a schematic balance sheet of a central bank decomposed 
into its local currency and foreign exchange parts. Obviously, the value of the net 
foreign exchange assets (denoted by NFXAt) is always financed by the net local cur-
rency liabilities (NCLt) and own capital (OWNt).  
Denote the interest-bearing part of net local currency liabilities by NIBLt . 
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the net liability stemming from open market operations, and the net local currency 
liabilities vis-à-vis the government and clients.  
On the  other hand, the  non-interest-bearing liabilities consist mainly of 
the currency stock (M0t). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the other non- 
-interest-bearing liabilities
5 may for practical purposes be subsumed into own capi-
tal t OWN .  
Consequently, we have the following stylized balance sheet of the central bank.  
                  0 tt t t t t NFXA NCL OWN NIBL M OWN = +=+ +                         (1) 
This means that the own capital in our definition is expressed as the difference 
between the bank’s net foreign exchange assets and net local currency liabilities.  
                           0 tt t t OWN NFXA NIBL M = −−                                             (2) 
In order to predict the future path of own capital OWN one needs to make 
projections of the three components on the right-hand side of (2). 
It is worth mentioning that the net foreign exchange assets and net local cur-
rency liabilities in the balance sheet (2) are separated, unless the bank carries out 
foreign exchange operations on its own account. This separation facilitates the link-
ing of OWNt to a macroeconomic projection.  
3.1 Net Local Currency Liabilities 
Unless the central bank buys foreign exchange on its own account in amounts 
INTt, the net local currency liabilities in the central bank’s balance sheet can change 
between two periods only because of interest paid, operating outlays, and dividend 
payments to the Treasury.  
As regards the interest rate, we assume that the main open market operations, 
banks’ current accounts, and other remunerated claims on the central bank carry 
the same interest.
6 Let this prevailing local short-term interest rate be denoted by it.  
Further, we denote by OLt the operating outlays that are necessary to sustain 
the mere functioning of the central bank, and finally by DIVt the dividend payments 
to the Treasury (or some quasi-fiscal operations of the central bank) in the period t. 
Summing up, one may write a recursive relation that governs this part of a central 
bank’s balance sheet  
               1 ttt t t t t NCL NCL NIBL i OL DIV INT + =+ + + +                                (3) 
At the same time,  t NCL  consists of net interest-bearing liabilities  t NIBL  and 
M0t. The demand for money links M0t to the volume of transactions in the economy 
and to the interest rate, while NIBLt becomes a residual item.  
5 Depending on the  local situation, banks’ reserve accounts may be a  part of non-interest-bearing lia-
bilities, which could be treated as part of M0t. 
6 We thus assume away any implicit taxation on the banking sector due to unremunerated required re-
serves. Note that the required reserves, which are the bulk component of current accounts, are indeed
remunerated at the main policy interest rate in the Czech Republic. This assumption also rules out any
quasi-fiscal operations in the form of preferential loans to the government, banking sector, etc. This is 
justified given our focus on foreign exchange reserves-related losses, but may not be realistic for many
countries. A generalization would be straightforward, though (see e.g. Holub, 2001a). Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                              195 
As usual, we approximate the transaction volume by the value of gross do-
mestic product and we also assume that the demand for money is negatively related 
to the interest rate. If  t P  is the price level then we write  
                                      0tt tt M mPG D P =                                                        (4) 
where monetization  t m  is given by  
                                             t i
t mc e
α − =                                                           (5) 
3.2 Net Foreign Exchange Assets 
The international reserves of the  central bank may be invested in various 
currencies. Let St be the exchange rate of the basket currency
7 representing the re-
serve portfolio at time t. Let us denote by Qt the size of the international reserves in 
terms of this basket currency. Therefore, the value of the reserves is given by 
                                         tt t NFXA S Q =                                                          (6) 
The value of the reserves is affected by exchange rate changes, by the  re-
serves’ own return Rt, and by the central bank’s foreign exchange operations. Then 
the local currency value of the international reserves in the next period is given by  
                            11 1 tt t t t t t N F X A SQ SQ R I N T ++ + = ++                                      (7) 
where INTt indicates the amount of foreign exchange bought by the central bank on 
its own account in period t.  
We may easily rewrite (7) as a law of motion for the foreign exchange reserves 







NFXA NFXA R INT
S
+
+ =+ +  
                                     1 tt t NFXA y INT
∗ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =+ +                                              (8) 
Using logarithmic approximation and denoting  11 ()( ) tt t t t s ss l n S l n S ++ Δ= −= −  
we may express t y
∗ , which is the net total return on the foreign exchange reserves, as  
                                            tt t ys R
∗ ≈ Δ+                                                        (9) 
3.3 The Dynamics of Own Capital 
The dynamics of own capital are easily derived by substituting (3) and (8) into 
(2). It follows that 
7 We assume that the  currency allocation of the  reserve assets is given exogenously by the  reserve 
management policy. If x
i
t is the  share of the  i-th currency in the  overall portfolio, if S
i
t stands for 
the exchange rate of the i-th currency, and if R
i
t is the net foreign currency return of the i-th portfolio, then 






















⎝⎠ ∑∑ . Note that the  basket currency 
exchange rate level can be arbitrarily rebased and consequently the  size of the  currency portfolio is 
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                             11 1 tt t OWN NFXA NCL + ++ = −  
      1 tt t t NFXA y INT NCL
∗ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =+ + − tt t t t NIBL i OL INT DIV − −− −  
                tt t t t t t OWN NFXA y NIBL i OL DIV
∗ =+ − − −                                (10) 
In words, central bank losses may arise because of large net local currency in-
terest-bearing liabilities (mainly open market operations to sterilize excess liquidity 
and current accounts of banks) that finance substantial parts of the foreign exchange 
assets in a situation where the total yield on foreign exchange assets is lower than 
the financing costs. Obviously, operating costs also detract from the profits.  
One may note that the variable INTt, representing foreign exchange opera-
tions, cancels out and does not enter directly into the calculation of the central bank’s 
profitability in (10). Therefore, one might in theory consider restructuring the balance 
sheet to diminish the holdings of foreign exchange assets and repaying the local cur-
rency interest-bearing liabilities. In practice, however, the feasibility of this solution 
could be limited in the short run because of the imperfect liquidity of the foreign 
exchange market and the related undesired consequences for the exchange rate. For 
further discussion on restructuring the central bank’s balance sheet see section 2.  
To sum up, the path for the accumulated profit or loss is calculated from (2) as 
a sum of the components NFXAt and –NCLt related by the foreign exchange oper-
ations. The trajectory of NFXAt is calculated using the difference equation (8). Simi-
larly for  t NCL  one uses (3), in which the currency stock is substituted from (4). 
3.4 Real Appreciation, the Risk Premium, and Central Bank Profits 
The balance-sheet model derived above sets the stage for a discussion of the re-
lationship between the  convergence process and the  emergence of central bank 
losses. To achieve this, one needs to invoke two basic equilibrium relationships of 
international macroeconomics, i.e., the relative version of purchasing power parity 
and uncovered interest rate parity.  
It is a well-known fact that purchasing power parity does not hold empirically 
unless one allows for changes in the real exchange rate caused by the economic con-
vergence process. We log-differentiate the definition of the (basket) real exchange 
rate and get  
                                  11 tt tt sq π π
∗
+ + Δ= Δ+ −                                                  (11) 
where  t s Δ  represents the change in the nominal exchange rate of the basket currency, 
t q Δ  the change in the real exchange rate of the basket currency,  1 t π +  domestic in-
flation, and  1 t π
∗
+  foreign inflation. Indeed, for a converging (catching-up) economy, 
real appreciation ( 0 t q Δ < ) is typically observed.  
Similarly, we extend the uncovered interest parity condition to capture the ex-
istence of the risk premium that inevitably surrounds the convergence process of any 
less developed economy. As the existence of this risk premium is a well-known fact 
to all market participants it may also be called the predictable excess return. Equation 
(12) captures it.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                              197 
                                     
* ˆ tt t t s ii φ = −Δ + −                                                      (12) 
where  t φ  represents the risk premium (predictable excess return),  ˆt s Δ  the expected 
change in the nominal exchange rate of the basket currency,  t i  the domestic nominal 
interest rate, and  t i
∗  the foreign nominal interest rate.  
In what follows we put  
                                            ˆtt s s Δ =Δ                                                            (13) 
which amounts to dealing with a perfect-foresight framework.
8  
The substitution of (11) and (13) into (12) gives for the interest rate  
                 tt t t ii s φ
∗ = ++ Δ 11 tt t t t iq φ ππ
∗ ∗
+ + =++ Δ+ −                                 (14) 
In the following text, we identify the money market rate  t i
∗  with the foreign 
portfolio return  t R . With this simplification,
9 the composite return  t y
∗  from (9) can 
be rewritten as  
                                           tt t y si
∗ ∗ = Δ+                                                       (15) 
and further using (12) it may be rephrased as  
                                           ttt yi φ
∗ = −                                                           (16) 
Finally, the following expression for the profit and loss before distribution can 
be derived using the law of motion for the central bank’s own capital (10), using 
the relationship (16) and the balance-sheet identity (2):  
                          11 tt t t PL OWN OWN DIV ++ = −+  
                          ( ) tt t t t t NFXA i NIBL i OL φ =− − −  
                         (0 ) tt t t t t iM O W N N F X A O L φ = +− −                                     (17) 
This expression decomposes central bank profits into seigniorage (monetary 
income;  0 tt iM ), earnings on the central bank’s own capital ( tt iO W N ), losses on net 
foreign exchange assets due to the risk premium ( tt NFXA φ ), and operating outlays 
( t OL ).  
Using the expression for the interest rate (14) we then arrive at  
   11 1 () ( 0 ) tt t t t t t t tt t PL i q M OWN NFXA OL πφ π φ
∗∗
++ + =− + Δ + + + − −          (18) 
which allows us to clarify the role of the main macroeconomic factors affecting cen-
tral bank profitability.  
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation shows the standard result 
that a central bank can (if 00 tt MO W N + > ) improve its profitability by increasing 
domestic inflation,
10 which raises its monetary income. However, the equation also 
8 A generalization allowing for unsystematic errors in exchange rate expectations would be straightforward
(see e.g. Holub, 2001a). 
9 Depending on its investment strategy, the central bank may, by taking on term or liquidity risk and ap-
propriating the ensuing premium, achieve systematically higher returns. 198                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
shows that the  central bank’s profit is crucially affected by convergence-related 
variables in combination with the structure of the central bank’s balance sheet. Since 
this is the primary focus of the present paper, let us elaborate on these issues in more 
detail.  
Provided that  00 tt MO W N + > , this decomposition shows that appreciation 
of the real exchange rate (i.e.,  0 t q Δ < ) reduces central bank profits by decreasing 
the equilibrium real interest rate in the domestic economy, and thus the seigniorage 
and earnings on the central bank’s own capital.
11 Note that this effect takes place 
even if the central bank holds zero net foreign exchange assets, i.e., even if there can 
be no revaluation losses due to an appreciating nominal exchange rate.  
It also implies that the trend real appreciation cannot be the sole source of 
central bank losses, as nominal interest rates cannot be negative. By reducing profits, 
it can nevertheless make the central bank more vulnerable to losses associated with 
net foreign exchange assets (or possibly other sources of loss, such as quasi-fiscal 
operations).  
For  00 tt MO W N + < , i.e., in the case where the central bank is liable when it 
comes to net interest-bearing claims,
12 the real appreciation helps, because it reduces 
the interest rate which the central bank pays for its net liabilities. However, in this 
dismal situation, and for 0 tt NFXA φ > , it may help only to reduce, not to overturn, 
the inevitable losses.  
Furthermore, equation (18) illustrates that the  impact of the  risk premium 
enters central bank profits through two channels. First, by increasing the domestic 
equilibrium interest rate it increases seigniorage and earnings on the central bank’s 
own capital, and thus improves profits. Second, it leads to losses on net foreign 
exchange assets, thus depressing profits. The  overall impact of the  risk premium 
therefore depends on the sign of (M0t + OWNt – NFXAt ), i.e., whether the size of 
the central bank’s non-interest-bearing liabilities is smaller or greater than its net 
foreign exchange assets. Note that the above expression is equal to –NIBLt. There-
fore, if the  central bank has net local currency interest-bearing assets, the  risk 
premium improves its profits. On the other hand, if the central bank has net local 
currency interest-bearing liabilities, the risk premium may lead to central bank losses. 
This is true especially if the  net foreign exchange assets exceed currency in cir-
culation and the  central bank’s own capital substantially, necessitating massive 
sterilization of the liquidity issued.  
3.5 Capital Ratio Dynamics  
For a  better understanding of the  loss dynamics in relation to currency in 
circulation we derive a detailed analytical exposition, which can be used for a com-
10 This is, of course, true only up to the point at which the increasing inflation leads to demonetization of 
the economy strong enough to outweigh the positive direct effect. Holub (2001b) also discusses that this
may actually not be true if a higher inflation rate increases the risk premium. 
11 There may be a partly offsetting effect of increased monetization resulting from the lower opportunity 
costs of holding the domestic currency. This is, however, unlikely to fully compensate for the direct effect 
for countries with low inflation rates. 
12 Recall that  0tt tt M OWN NFXA NIBL += −. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                              199 
parative-static discussion of a central bank’s financial sustainability. We start with 
equation (10), which, using (2) and (16), can be equivalently expressed as  
          1 (1 ) 0 tt t t t t t t t OWN i OWN i M NFXA OL DIV φ + = ++ −− −                    (19) 
Expressing central bank capital as a ratio to the currency stock, which prop-
erly reflects its relative importance in the balance sheet (see Holub, 2001b; and Ize, 
2005), we get that  




01 0 ( 1 ) 0
tt t t t t t t t
tt t t t









                 (20) 
where  t μ  is the growth rate of currency in circulation. Assuming that the dividend to 
the  government is non-negative, i.e., that the  central bank receives no capital in-
jections from the government, this implies an inequality  




01 0 ( 1 ) 0
tt t t t t t t
tt t t t









                      (21) 
Note that this expression is analogous to the government debt equation when 
expressed as a ratio to GDP. The second term on the right-hand side is central bank 
profit if the central bank has zero own capital, which is analogous to the primary 
surplus of public budgets. Following Ize (2005), we will call this expression core 
profits.
 13  The first term on the right-hand side reflects the dynamics of the ratio of 
capital to currency, which crucially depends on the relationship between the interest 
rate and currency growth, by analogy with the relationship of the interest rate and 
economic growth for the public debt-to-GDP ratio.  
To assess whether the financial situation of a central bank is sustainable or 
not, one must evaluate inequality (21) for the given exogenous parameters and cen-
tral bank policy goals. The policy goals naturally include the inflation rate (target), 
which also has implications for nominal currency growth.  
Initially, we will also treat the nfxa ratio (i.e., NFXAt/M0t) as a fully auto-
nomous policy decision of the central bank, which is in line with the approach taken 
by Holub (2001b) and Ize (2005). This in general implies that the central bank needs 
to intervene in the foreign exchange markets automatically to keep the nfxa ratio at 
a constant level. This assumption greatly simplifies the first exposition of the prob-
lem, as it allows us to treat core profits as a constant. The assumption is, however, 
not very realistic for most cases, and we relax it later on.  
3.5.1 Constant Ratio of Net Foreign Exchange Assets 
With this assumption, inequality (21) can be illustrated in a  simple phase 
diagram in which the ratio of central bank capital to currency at time t is put on 
the horizontal axis and the same ratio at time t + 1 is shown on the vertical axis. 
Inequality (21) is the  shaded region below the  straight solid line with a  slope of 
(1 ) (1 ) tt i μ +/ +  and an intercept given by core profits. 
13 Ize (2005) derives his model in continuous time and in a log-linearized form, which leads to some minor 
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Based on (21), we can differentiate between four cases:  
1a) currency growth exceeds the nominal interest rate (or equivalently, real currency 
growth exceeds the real interest rate); core profits are positive; 
1b) currency growth exceeds the nominal interest rate; core profits are negative; 
2a) currency growth is below the nominal interest rate; core profits are positive; 
2b) currency growth is below the nominal interest rate; core profits are negative.  
These cases are illustrated in the corresponding panels in Figure 1, which also 
include the dashed 45-degree lines representing steady-state points.  
In cases 1a and 1b the capital ratio exhibits stable dynamics. The growth rate 
of currency is high, which means that the relative importance of the starting level of 
capital gets quickly “eroded” and the capital ratio eventually converges to a steady- 
-state level (OWN/M0)
1a or (OWN/M0)
1b, respectively. This is the maximum level 
that the capital ratio can achieve in the steady state; lower levels than that can of 
course be achieved by paying dividends to the government. With positive core prof-
its, i.e., in case 1a, the steady-state level of capital is positive, implying no financial 
problems for the central bank.
14 With negative core profits, i.e., in case 1b, the situ-
ation is much more difficult. The central bank creates losses, which grow over time 
Figure 1  Phase Diagram of the Central Bank’s “Capital Ratio”
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14 Problems could emerge, however, if a negative starting level of central bank capital caused distrust in
the currency and thus led to a decline in the currency growth rate or to an increase in interest rates due to 
a rising risk premium. The situation could then change to case 2a (or even 2b). If the negative net capital 
of the central bank was below (OWN/M0)
2a at that moment, the capital deficit would start to grow at 
an explosive pace. This would validate the initial distrust in the currency, creating scope for self-fulfilling 
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until the steady-state level of the negative capital ratio is reached. Moreover, a capital 
transfer to such a  loss-making central bank is not a  long-run solution, as the  fast 
currency growth tends to decrease the ratio of capital to currency, and thus shifts 
the central bank back into losses toward the same negative steady-state level of capi-
tal.
15 Even with a negative level of capital (OWN/M0)
1b the central bank can function, 
but there is at least a theoretical danger of a self-fulfilling credibility crisis with 
a switch to case 2b. A financial collapse of the central bank would follow, or the cen-
tral bank would have to abandon some of its policy goals. The  only permanent 
solution is to make changes that shift central bank core profits into positive territory, 
i.e., to shift the situation to case 1a.  
Ize (2005) disregards cases 1a and 1b as unrealistic in the long run, argu- 
ing that a dynamically efficient economy requires real interest rates above the GDP 
growth rate, which is likely to exceed the real growth rate of currency in circulation 
in the modern times of expanding electronic money. In other words, an inequality  
(i – π) >  g >(μ – π) is assumed, where g is the  real GDP growth rate. While this 
should be the case in the very long run, i.e., in the ultimate steady state of an econ-
omy, along the  convergence path of a  catching-up economy this need not hold. 
In a converging small open economy, the equilibrium real interest rate implied by 
the UIP condition is equal to the equilibrium foreign real interest rate minus the real 
appreciation trend plus the  risk premium (14), i.e., to () iq π φ
∗∗ − +Δ + . Even if 
the foreign real interest rate exceeds the foreign economic growth rate, the domestic 
real interest rate may be smaller than the  foreign one if the  risk premium is suf-
ficiently small and real appreciation relatively fast. Moreover, GDP growth is faster 
in a converging economy, making the inequality less likely to hold. Finally, the mon-
etization of the economy may be growing during a convergence process, in many 
cases supported by progress with disinflation, and with it currency growth may ex-
ceed the GDP growth rate. Putting all this together, an inverse inequality (i – π) <  
< g < (μ – π) may actually hold for a relatively long period of time during the con-
vergence process.  
Proceeding to the other two cases, 2a and 2b, the capital ratio exhibits ex-
plosive dynamics. Interest rates are higher than currency growth, which means that 
the central bank profits/losses are more than sufficient to create additional positive/ 
/negative capital to cover the newly issued currency. This implies that the deviations 
of the capital ratio from its steady-state levels tend to magnify themselves over time. 
More precisely, this is true only for downward deviations, as higher-than-steady-state 
capital ratios can easily be solved by paying dividends to the government. Case 2a 
with positive core profits can be regarded as the standard profit-making central bank 
situation. The central bank can permanently maintain any capital ratio above a certain 
negative threshold level (OWN/M0)
2a. A problem arises only if a shock shifts the cen-
tral bank capital below (OWN/M0)
2a. Then the  situation becomes unstable. A  re-
capitalization of the central bank would be a permanent solution in this case, though.  
15 Stella (1997) writes that “recapitalization becomes necessary when losses turn chronic,” but he also adds
that “recapitalization makes sense only when government is committed to adopting other necessary sup-
porting reforms”. In this case, “supporting reforms” can be interpreted as changes that shift the central bank to 
case 1a by raising its revenues or cutting its costs (e.g. avoiding quasi-fiscal operations and reducing the nfxa
ratio over time in favor of domestic currency assets). Such a comprehensive recapitalization would, of 
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With negative core profits, i.e., in case 2b, the critical level of capital is posi-
tive. The central bank generates core losses, which must be compensated by earnings 
on its own capital.
16 Otherwise, the losses start growing, the capital declines, and 
eventually the central bank financially collapses, or is forced to give up its policy 
goals. The own capital thus must be above (OWN/M0)
2b in this situation. An alter-
native, of course, is to reduce the  central bank’s costs in some way in order to 
achieve positive core profits and move to situation 2a.  
The steady-state values of the capital ratio can be expressed from equation 
(20) as  








                                                       (22) 
where  ii q π φπ
∗∗ =− + Δ + + and where own  denotes the capital ratio, nfxa the ratio 
of net foreign exchange assets to currency, and ol the ratio of operating outlays to 
currency. This expression is equivalent to the concept of core capital in Ize (2005). It 
allows us to calculate in a closed form the capital ratio to which the central bank will 
be converging, given the exogenous factors and policy parameters.  
3.5.2 Variable Ratio of Net Foreign Exchange Assets 
Let us now drop the  assumption that the  nfxa ratio is a  fully autonomous 
policy variable. Instead, we will start treating it as a path-dependent variable with its 
own endogenous dynamics. The endogenous dynamics may not always be resisted 
with central bank interventions, but may sometimes even be welcome if they help to 
achieve a desirable balance-sheet adjustment. In this regard, a key distinction that we 
are going to make is whether the balance-sheet adjustment can be achieved in a pas-
sive manner, i.e., with zero sales or purchases of foreign exchange reserves (INTt = 0), 
or whether an active adjustment of the balance sheet is needed. To answer this, we 
can use equation (8), describing the development of net foreign exchange assets over 
time, and rewrite it for the nfxa ratio using (16) as:  
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For the passive adjustment scenario, the second term on the right-hand side is 
equal to zero. The development of the nfxa ratio over time then depends only on 
the relationship between the local currency return on foreign exchange assets and 
the  currency growth rate. If the  former is smaller than the  latter, the  nfxa ratio is 
going to decline over time and eventually converge toward zero. In other words, 
the relatively fast currency growth rate combined with relatively low earnings on 
foreign exchange assets is going to erode the importance of foreign exchange assets 
in the central bank’s balance sheet. As a result, the source of central bank losses will 
disappear.  
16 In this situation, the central bank in fact functions as a foundation that needs enough starting capital to 
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Note that the above condition will hold with certainty if there is a positive risk 
premium (which is the case we are interested in) and domestic interest rates are lower 
than the currency growth rate, as the inequality  
                                       () yi i φ μ
∗ = −< <                                                  (24) 
must hold in such a  situation. In this optimistic case, the  losses stemming from 
the  risk premium in combination with a  high nfxa ratio are thus a  self-correcting 
problem under a passive adjustment scenario with relatively fast currency growth. 
Case 1b from Figure 1 eventually turns into case 1a.  
A much less favorable situation would emerge if  
                                      () iy i φ μ
∗ >= − >                                                   (25) 
In such a case the nfxa ratio would grow without limits and the passive ad-
justment scenario would not be plausible.  
The active balance sheet adjustment involves selling the  foreign exchange 
assets of central banks. In practice, it has been undertaken for example in Chile and 
Mexico. This option is limited by the possible undesired consequences it may have 
for the exchange rate. A way of active adjustment without such fallout is to transfer 
the “excess” foreign exchange assets to the government, e.g. into a sovereign wealth 
fund, in exchange for domestic interest-bearing assets. This strategy has indeed been 
pursued in some countries. Furthermore, there have been proposals that the central 
bank may opportunistically sell to the market when there are depreciation pressures. 
However, such leaning-against-the-wind can create the  perception that the  central 
bank will insure speculators and that currency is a safe one-way bet. Therefore, it 
seems that there might be a  case for preannounced automatic measures designed 
to minimize the interference of balance-sheet management with monetary policy. 
The CNB’s scheme of selling a portion of its earnings on foreign exchange reserves, 
which has been in place since 2004, falls into this category.  
4. The CNB’s Balance Sheet: From Deep Losses to Future Profitability 
The Czech National Bank is an example of a central bank facing economic 
convergence challenges.
17 It is illustrated in Figure 2 that as of 2007, the CNB’s 
assets were dominated by foreign exchange reserves, the volume of which was more 
than double that of currency in circulation.  
The large stock of foreign reserves was mirrored on the liability side by items 
stemming from sterilization of excess liquidity (i.e., CZK-denominated interest- 
-bearing liabilities to the domestic banking sector), which was created by purchases 
of foreign currency assets. The sterilization is necessary to keep short-term interest 
rates at the desired level from the monetary policy point of view.  
The stock of foreign reserves has risen from a relatively modest initial level 
equivalent to 1.9 bn. euro in 1993
18 more than tenfold to above 23 bn. euro in 2007. 
17 The  CNB is also an  instructive example due to its transparent accounting practices, in particular
the  marking-to-market of its foreign exchange reserves. This means that the  costs associated with its 
foreign exchange reserves are openly revealed in its books. At the same time, the CNB is allowed to retain 
its profits until its accumulated loss is fully repaid. The  institutional set-up is thus in line with 
the assumptions that were used in the theoretical model. For countries with different accounting practices
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Table 1 shows that the foreign reserves have grown large not only in absolute terms, 
but also relatively with respect to currency in circulation.  
Roughly half of the current foreign exchange reserves were accumulated be-
fore May 1997. In that period, CNB followed a de facto fixed exchange rate regime 
and over time it had to purchase more and more of the foreign capital attracted by 
privatization and gradual liberalization of capital flows. But even though in 1997 
the exchange rate was allowed to float, a significant amount of foreign reserves has 
been acquired since that time. This reflects three episodes of foreign exchange mar-
ket interventions
19 and also direct purchases of government privatization revenues.
20 
By these measures, in effect by adding liquidity to the foreign exchange market, 
the CNB attempted to avoid disorderly nominal appreciation of the currency.  
4.1 A Brief History of the Losses 
Figure 2 also indicates that in 2007 the CNB’s own capital was negative at 
almost 50% of the currency issued. Even though quasi-fiscal losses related to bank-
ing sector rescue were incurred in the second half of the 1990s, the bulk of the ac-
cumulated loss stems from appreciation of Czech koruna and marking-to-market of 
the foreign exchange reserves, as Table 2 illustrates. 
In the  table, certain transactions with the  government, operating costs and 
other items are omitted. For a complete and precise description of the CNB’s financ-
ing, see the CNB’s Financial Reports (available on the CNB website).  
The macroeconomic reasons for this loss can be directly mapped to the factors 
listed in the discussion in section 4 after equation (18): real appreciation, disinflation 
and inflation targets that have been gradually lowered, and also the risk premium of 
the Czech economy systematically contributed to the CNB’s negative P/L.  
We applied the framework developed in sections 1 to 3 to the historical data 
and compared it with the CNB’s actual accounting data. Specifically, we took the ac- 











18 When Czechoslovakia was split into the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
19 In 1998, late-1999/early-2000, and 2001–2002. 
20 It is interesting to note that the CNB’s agreement with the government on purchases of privatization re-
venues included government participation in the expected sterilization costs incurred by the CNB. This 
measure was taken to limit the negative consequences of further foreign exchange reserves accumulation
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tual balance sheet at a particular past date and conducted the model projection using 
the ex-post known development of the koruna exchange rate, local and foreign in-
terest rates, gross domestic product, the  consumer price level, the  actual foreign 
exchange operations conducted by the  CNB on its own account, and the  CNB’s 
actual operating outlays. 
Figures 3 and 4 show that the projections follow the actual development quite 
closely. This corroborates that the model is internally consistent and has captured 
the most important factors affecting the CNB balance sheet. It shows that the balance 
sheet of the central bank may indeed be driven mainly by macroeconomic factors 
over which it can have no or very limited control. 
Table 1  The CNB’s Foreign Exchange Reserves (yearly averages in millions) 
Year  CZK  Euro  Ratio to currency
1993      65 462    1 930  1.17 
1994   147 858    4 331  1.74 
1995   269 092    7 840  2.54 
1996   352 217  10 364  2.74 
1997   350 250    9 727  2.55 
1998   365 667  10 149  2.59 
1999   424 683  11 518  2.65 
2000   489 532  13 788  2.61 
2001   511 725  15 092  2.62 
2002   632 779  20 601  3.00 
2003   708 712  22 225  3.03 
2004   690 005  21 630  2.70 
2005   696 780  23 402  2.53 
2006   683 887  24 191  2.26 
2007   652 158  23 511  1.94 
Source: CNB 
 
Table 2  CNB Profits/Losses from Selected Operations (in CZK billion) 
Year  Asset Revaluation 
Profits/Losses 








1993   -1.86  0.38  0.00  -1.48 
1994   1.54  -4.04  -2.88  -5.38 
1995   1.00  7.30  -3.60  4.70 
1996   -8.34  2.10  -1.45  -7.69 
1997   44.65  0.79  -35.69  9.75 
1998   -35.61  -6.39  -26.10  -68.10 
1999   31.52  0.42  1.69  33.63 
2000   -3.52  7.88  -1.58  2.78 
2001   -40.12  12.70  1.05  -26.37 
2002   -26.15  11.38  0.57  -14.20 
2003   -29.77  12.84  0.76  -16.17 
2004   -61.14  8.16  0.88  -52.10 
2005   8.73  10.91  1.19  19.96 
2006   -66.99  10.12  1.34  -56.39 
2007   -47.67  13.97  0.02  -37.50 
Source: CNB 206                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
 
Although the  actual dynamics of the  explanatory factors listed above were 
utilized, the very good fit of the CNB own capital projection in Figure 3 is not auto-
matic. Consider for example the projected and actual dynamics of net foreign ex-
change assets. While the model assumes that their yield is mechanically determined 
by the respective one-year interest rate swap rates, the actual duration or credit risk 
profile of the foreign exchange reserves portfolio, or active foreign exchange rate 
management thereof, may lead to higher or lower earnings. The correspondence be-
tween the  projection and reality confirms that the  foreign exchange assets were 
invested in a rather conservative manner in the past. The good fit also depends on 
the fact that the growth rates of  0 M  are modeled well enough and that the bulk of 
the CNB’s net local currency liabilities are remunerated at the monetary policy in-
terest rate.
21 
4.2 The CNB’s Balance-Sheet Sustainability 
The framework derived in section 3 is suitable for assessing whether a central 
bank’s balance sheet is sustainable along the convergence path. As an illustration, we 
apply the framework to the CNB’s case. We first provide an analytical exposition of 
Figure 3  The CNB’s Actual Own Capital and Historical Projection
                          
























Source: The authors´ calculations. 
 
Figure 4  The CNB’s Actual Net Foreign Exchange Assets and Historical Projection 
                           

























Source: The authors´ calculations. 
21 For example that fixed assets or gold represent a very small proportion of total local currency liabilities. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                              207 
its balance-sheet sustainability using analytical comparative-statics and then move to 
direct simulation exercises.  
In order to use the model, one needs to make assumptions regarding the key 
macroeconomic variables. Importantly, those assumptions should be internally con-
sistent and should reflect some basic consensus concerning the long-run trends of 
the economy. Therefore, the modeling of the balance sheet is based on the CNB’s 
macroeconomic forecast as published in the CNB’s Inflation Report.
22 The CNB’s 
forecast splits into two parts: business cycle fluctuations and underlying long-run 
trends. The business cycle is simulated using the CNB Quarterly Projection Model,
23 
and the long-run trends are chosen consistently with the model assumptions. For our 
long-term balance-sheet projections, the  trends and equilibrium values underlying 
the forecast are, of course, more important than the business cycle dynamics.  
4.2.1 Comparative-Static Exposition  
The comparative statics of the CNB’s capital ratio as suggested in subsections 4 
and 5 are based on the long-term assumptions underlying the CNB’s macroeconomic 
forecast (produced in October 2007). Specifically, those values include an inflation 
target of 3% (to be lowered to 2% in 2010), a foreign equilibrium real interest rate 
of 1.8%, an equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation of 3.3%, a risk premium of 
2.3%, an nfxa ratio of 2.00, and an operating outlays ratio of 0.7%. We assume long- 
-run nominal currency growth equal to 8%. The stock variables are set to their cur-
rent values.  
With these assumptions, the  CNB currently finds itself in situation 1b de-
scribed in subsection  3.5.1 (see Figure 1). The  corresponding steady-state capital 
ratio is -0.36. This means that if nothing changes, the accumulated loss in the CNB’s 
balance sheet would eventually be smaller than it is now relative to currency in 
circulation, but would remain negative. The factor that would prevent the loss from 
increasing explosively would be fast currency growth exceeding the assumed equi-
librium nominal interest rate (equal to 3.8%).  
The results are sensitive to the  assumed values of the  key parameters and 
policy variables. For example, should the risk premium be one percentage point high-
er than assumed and all other things remain unchanged, which is certainly not un-
realistic given the  past estimated values of the  risk premium, the negative steady- 
-state capital ratio would widen to –0.78, which exceeds the current level noticeably. 
Moreover, the  announced reduction of the  inflation target to 2%, all other things 
being the same as in the baseline scenario, also worsens the steady-state capital ratio 
to –0.60. Finally, if the nominal currency growth rate fell to 5%, perhaps due to 
a lower potential real GDP growth rate, which is quite likely in the longer run, 
the negative steady-state capital ratio would deepen further to –1.14 with the new infla-
tion target. In any case, these calculations do not paint a bright picture for the CNB.  
Fortunately, though, the relevant parameters and variables are unlikely to stay 
at their current values forever. Focusing first on exogenous parameters, the CNB’s 
22 The central CNB macroeconomic forecast is used. Its risks are not quantified in full; nevertheless, dis-
tributions derived from past forecasting errors are provided. Alternative scenarios are employed to tackle
uncertainty. 
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forecasts assume that both the risk premium and the real exchange rate appreciation 
should be falling over time, toward 0% and 1% respectively. Such a change would 
improve the CNB’s core profits to roughly 3.1% of currency in circulation (2.1% for 
the new inflation target), shifting it to case 1a from Figure 1. The steady-state capital 
ratio would reach +0.74 under these assumptions (0.50 with the lowered inflation 
target; 0.95 with the lower inflation target and 5% nominal currency growth).  
In Figure 5 we plot the combinations of the risk premium and real exchange 
rate appreciation that would lead to zero core profits of the CNB, given the current 
policy parameters (with the 3% inflation target) and would thus gradually bring 
the capital ratio toward zero. The CNB’s current situation lies above the zero profit 
line, which means that the core profits of the CNB are negative. It can be seen that 
with the  current estimated level of the  risk premium (2.3%), the  equilibrium real 
exchange rate appreciation would have to fall to 1.8% a year to ensure zero core 
profits. Or with the current pace of real appreciation (3.3%) the risk premium would 
have to decline to 0.8%. The  long-run assumptions of the  forecast for the  future 
imply, however, that the CNB will shift to positive core profit territory. 
Another two margins of adjustment of core profits are the policy variables, 
i.e., the inflation target and the nfxa ratio. An increase in the inflation target and/or 
a reduction in the nfxa ratio would push the zero profit line in Figure 5 in the north- 
-east direction. If the change was sufficiently strong, zero core profits could be 
reached even with the current exogenous variables. In Figure 6 we thus plot the com-
binations of the two policy variables that would lead to zero core profits for the cur-
rent estimated risk premium (2.3%) and real equilibrium exchange rate appreciation 
(3.3%).
24 It can be seen that with the current nfxa ratio, the inflation target would 
have to be 4.5% to assure zero core profits. This contrasts with the existing 3% target 
(and even more so with the 2% target from January 2010). To make the 3% target 
Figure 5  Combinations of the Risk Premium and Real Appreciation Implying Zero 
Core Profits 




























































Source: The authors´ calculations. 
24 Ize (2005) calculates the “core rate of inflation as the threshold rate of inflation that ensures zero core 
profitability”. Such an approach has a shortcoming, though. It implicitly assumes that the inflation target is 
the only policy margin of adjustment, or that it is the first one to be used. However, as Ize (2005) shows,
the core rate of inflation is a function of the nfxa ratio, i.e., another policy variable that can be influenced 
by central bank decisions. It is realistic to assume that most central banks would prefer to adjust their bal-
ance-sheet structures to achieve zero core profits before giving up their inflation goals. The two policy 
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sustainable with the current exogenous variables, the nfxa ratio would have to fall to 
1.35 (0.91 for the new inflation target), i.e., by about 33% compared to its current 
level.  
Such a change of the balance-sheet structure is hardly achievable in the short 
term. It would require massive sales of the CNB’s foreign exchange reserves, most 
probably contributing to a huge exchange-rate appreciation, which would be in con-
flict with the CNB’s policy goals and would, moreover, deepen the accumulated loss 
of the CNB even further by fostering exchange rate appreciation.  
In this paper, however, we are concerned mainly with the long-run sustain-
ability of the central bank’s balance sheet, and a balance-sheet adjustment may well 
be achievable in the long run. This is true especially in those cases where the starting 
nfxa ratio does not reflect true policy preferences such as maintaining international 
liquidity, but is rather a by-product of the past exchange rate regime or intervention 
decisions. We believe that this is the CNB’s case. At the same time, the CNB’s case 
is characterized by the optimistic scenario (24). The baseline of the CNB forecast 
(which includes the new 2% inflation target as a steady-state assumption) together 
with the assumptions about currency growth imply that the  nfxa ratio is going to 
decline below 0.9 around the year 2020 if no interventions are carried out. Even 
though the exact date is, of course, dependent on the assumptions made, the CNB 
should eventually get into a profit-making situation.  
4.2.2 Simulation into the Future 
While the exposition of the CNB’s accumulated loss dynamics provided in 
the previous subsection was based on a closed-form solution and allowed useful 
comparative-static exercises, it has its important limitations, too. In reality, most of 
the relevant variables (i.e., the risk premium, the equilibrium real exchange rate ap-
preciation, the nfxa ratio, etc.) are likely to change over time simultaneously, which 
is hard to capture using the  comparative-static approach. Moreover, the  transitory 
dynamics, and not just the steady-state values captured by the analytical solution, are 
likely to be of interest to policy makers, too.  
Figure 7 depicts the projection based on the initial condition for the CNB’s own 
capital in the first quarter of 2007 using the macroeconomic forecast from the fourth 
Figure 6 Combinations of the NFXA Ratio and Inflation Target Implying Zero Core 
Profits 
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quarter of 2007, consistently with the long-term values in section 4.2.1. Additionally, 
it is assumed that long-run potential output growth will decline gradually from 5% 
toward 3% in the simulations. It governs nominal GDP growth, which is of primary 
importance for the expected growth of households’ cash holdings. The ratio of cash 
holdings to nominal GDP (monetization) has been growing in the Czech economy 
since 1993, and is about 9.5% of annual nominal GDP at present. The growth rate of 
cash holdings is currently roughly 10%, close to the average growth rate of 10.5%. 
In order to model cash holdings properly one should of course also apply 
the elasticity of money demand to the nominal interest rate. In reality, however, the ra-
tio of cash holdings depends on interest rates only marginally, as estimated by Ha-
nousek and Tůma (1995), and it is unlikely that the level of monetization will grow 
further in the future. As a result, the level of monetization remains roughly the same 
in our baseline simulation, causing the growth of cash holdings to converge toward 
the growth of nominal GDP.  
In addition, we assume that the foreign equilibrium real interest rate will rise 
gradually toward 2%. In particular we deal with the US and Eurozone interest rates, 
as the CNB holds both the US dollar and the euro as its main reserve currencies. 
Long-run inflation is assumed to be 2% for both the Eurozone and the US. Also, 
the risk premium is assumed to decline over time toward 0%. Finally, the current 
value of the trend real exchange rate appreciation is assumed to decline gradually 
toward 1%, reflecting the expected convergence slowdown. The real exchange rate 
appreciation in accordance with the assumed inflation differential consequently de-
termines the expected path of the nominal exchange rate.  
We assume that the foreign exchange reserves are invested in the euro or dol-
lar money market with a one-year maturity. Future returns on these reserves are mod-
eled using implied forward rates adjusted for the term premium. The term premium is 
positively related to the  forward horizon, but the  relationship is less than propor-
tional. It was calibrated in such a way that at very long horizons the projected future 
one-year maturity rate coincides with the assumed equilibrium interest rate.  
We assume that the return on the foreign exchange reserves is relatively con-
servative and that in reality it is possible to perform better. In fact, the actual duration 
of the CNB’s portfolios is higher than one year. We also assume, in line with the cur-
rent policy, that the CNB will sell the foreign currency interest (coupons) earned on 
Figure 7  Future Simulation of the CNB’s Own Capital 
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its reserves in return for koruna. However, no other foreign exchange operations are 
taken into account in the simulation.  
We further assume that the CNB neither pays dividends to the state budget nor 
receives any government support. Therefore, we assume that  0 DIV = .  
It follows from Figure 7 that the period of losses is not fully over yet. The base-
line scenario predicts that the  own capital becomes initially even more negative. 
Table 3 shows that despite the continued fast growth of cash holdings the central 
bank will remain a net borrower in the domestic currency for the next 10–11 years, 
which implies related costs for monetary policy conduct. The nominal GDP expan-
sion, however, will lead to growth of the unremunerated liabilities represented by 
currency in circulation at the  expense of costly sterilizations. This, together with 
the return on the foreign exchange reserves, becomes sufficient to eliminate the losses 
almost entirely at the horizon of seven years. The negative own capital then stops ris-
ing and later on starts to decline. The return of own capital to positive values be-
comes fast as soon as the growth of cash holdings eliminates the need to sterilize 
liquidity and the CNB becomes a net creditor in the domestic currency.  
The evolution of the CNB’s balance sheet structure in relative terms is illus-
trated in Figures 8 and 9, which show the phase diagrams of projected own capital 
ratio and the  nfxa ratio. It is evident that despite the  initial worsening, the  losses 
remain repayable by the stream of future profits in the baseline scenario and the capi-
tal ratio may eventually grow to substantially positive levels (Figure 8). Time is on 
the CNB’s side, and growth of currency in circulation does the trick. First, the lia-
bility side of the balance sheet becomes dominated by currency and at some moment 
in time the central bank may stop the costly withdrawal of liquidity from the banking 
sector altogether and start to provide liquidity to it. From this moment, the asset side 
also becomes more favorable. At the beginning the bulk of the assets were in foreign 
low-yielding currency, whereas with liquidity provisioning the asset composition will 
tilt toward the local currency.  
Furthermore, it might be reasonable to expect, in line with the simulation’s 
underlying assumptions, that the appreciation of the real exchange will decline and 
will be a smaller drag on profits. Moreover, the declining  NIBL, and with it a falling 
nfxa ratio (Figure 9), will limit the negative influence of the declining, but still posi- 
Table 3  CNB Balance-Sheet Projections Based on the CNB’s Macroeconomic 
Forecast From Q4 2007 (in CZK billion) 
Year  OWN  NFXA  M0  NIBL  OL (flow 
p.a.) 
2007  -148  650  326  472  1.9 
2009  -154  630  370  415  2.1 
2011  -161  605  455  310  2.2 
2013  -155  581  542  195  2.3 
2015  -140  562  625  77  2.4 
2017  -115  549  704  -40  2.5 
2019  -83  537  793  -173  2.6 
2021  -43  526  890  -321  2.7 
2023  5  516  993  -482  2.8 
2030  245  480  1423  -1188  3.2 
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tive, risk premium. Finally, once NIBL turns negative the remaining risk premium 
will even support profitability. Thus, currency growth and the gradually dying out of 
the real exchange rate appreciation are the forces behind the return of own capital to-
ward positive values. As these factors are quite likely to happen in the future, the ac-
cumulated loss is similarly likely to be paid off.  
One of course needs to keep in mind the importance of the underlying as-
sumptions that lead to the repayment of the losses in the future. For some macroeco-
nomic scenarios, the  passive adjustment mechanism may not be viable. In subsec-
tion 4.2.1 we analyzed in a comparative-static setting which values of the exogenous 
and policy variables would keep the central bank in core losses and thus prevent 
the  future repayment of its current negative own capital. Similarly, one can run 
alternative or stress-test simulations to see if a particular mix of assumptions puts 
the central bank’s balance sheet on a sustainable path.  
We chose to illustrate this potential of the derived framework on a variable 
which did not receive so much attention in the  comparative-static discussion of 
subsection 4.2.1, i.e., the nominal currency growth rate. In Figure 7 above, we pre-
Figure 8  Phase Diagram of the Projected CNB Own Capital Ratio
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Figure 9  Phase Diagram of the Projected CNB’s NFXA Ratio 
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sent an  alternative simulation based on the  assumption that the  monetization will 
gradually decline to 7% of annual nominal GDP, instead of remaining constant as 
in the baseline scenario. It turns out that although quantitatively important, the as-
sumption of persistently high monetization is not crucial for the result that the CNB 
should be able to generate enough future profits to reverse its negative own capital 
if  the  other assumptions of the  baseline scenario remain unchanged. Significantly 
slower growth of cash holdings delays repayment of the accumulated loss by about 
5 years, but does not change the position in a qualitative manner.  
5. Conclusions 
Central bank losses and negative capital have become an important issue of 
policy debate, reflecting the experience of numerous central banks across the world. 
The source of the losses can differ substantially across countries and periods of time. 
While the earlier literature focused mainly on quasi-fiscal operations, more recent 
contributions have focused on the losses associated with high net foreign exchange 
reserves.  
The latter source of losses is the focal point of the present paper. We have 
shown that central bank balance sheets in converging (emerging market) economies 
can be prone to systematic losses. This is especially true for countries that have 
achieved disinflation and at the same time have to sterilize liquidity issued in the past 
due to massive purchases of foreign exchange reserves. From the accounting point of 
view, the losses manifest themselves as revaluation of foreign exchange reserves. 
From the economic point of view, the decrease in seigniorage (monetary income) due 
to low nominal interest rates, combined with the risk-premium-related costs of hold-
ing large net foreign exchange reserves, is responsible for the losses.  
Building on Holub (2001b), Bindseil et al. (2004), and Ize (2005), our paper 
provides a practical framework for assessing the ability of a central bank to remain 
solvent given the current level of its own capital, the structure of its balance sheet, 
and long-term economic prospects. To achieve this, we have developed a more com-
prehensive model of the  central bank’s balance sheet and its linkages to macro-
economic trends than the earlier literature. Most importantly, we have analyzed in 
more depth the consequences of economic convergence for the evolution of the cen-
tral bank’s balance sheet and the important role played in this process by the risk 
premium and equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation. A combination of a closed- 
-form comparative-static analysis and numerical solutions of the future evolution of 
the central bank’s own capital has been used to expose the problem from different 
angles and exploit some complementarities of the two approaches which have not 
been combined in earlier papers.  
The present paper applies the derived framework to the CNB’s case. We show 
that if the risk premium, equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation and net foreign 
exchange reserves ratio remained at their current levels, the CNB would continue 
to record large “core losses” with its low inflation targets (2% from 2010). Given 
the fast growth rate of currency in circulation, the CNB’s capital ratio would con-
verge to a steady-state negative level of roughly –60%. Moreover, one cannot ex-
clude even more pessimistic outcomes for plausible variations in the  underlying 
assumptions.  214                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
This is not, however, a realistic long-term scenario. As economic convergence 
progresses, the risk premium is likely to fade away, as is the real exchange rate ap-
preciation trend. Moreover, the net foreign exchange reserves ratio will gradually fall 
if the CNB engages in no future foreign exchange interventions. Taking the long-run 
trends from the  CNB’s forecasts and assuming no interventions, our simulations 
show that the CNB will be able to repay its current accumulated loss out of future 
profits. The most plausible scenarios suggest that the loss will take roughly 15 years 
to repay. Given this prospect, we believe that the accumulated loss can be kept in 
the CNB’s books without damaging monetary policy credibility and without recourse 
to public budgets to cover the loss. One should always keep in mind that any such 
government participation in central bank financing could constrain the bank’s opera-
tional independence, making such participation less attractive than the  repayment 
strategy based on the central bank’s future profits. This strategy should be openly 
communicated to the  public and political representatives to address the credibility 
challenges arising from the central bank’s negative capital.  
While the CNB’s case has many specific features and the conclusions reached 
in our paper may not be directly transferable to other central banks, the derived frame-
work itself is fairly general and could be successfully applied to other countries’ 
experience. We leave this as a challenge for future research. 
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